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N.J.R.E. 608 AND SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT: 
THE TIME HAS COME FOR NEW JERSEY TO JOIN THE 
MAJORITY 
Jenn Montan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Every trial, whether criminal or civil, requires the factfinder, whether 
judge or jury, to carefully weigh the competing evidence and determine the 
disputed issues between the parties.  As such, the right of the parties to 
impeach the credibility of the witnesses is fundamental to the truth-seeking 
process in all litigation.  The right to impeach is considered such an important 
right that Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 607 expressly authorizes witness 
impeachment and provides that “[a]ny party, including the party that called 
the witness, may attack the witness’s credibility.”1 
There are various, well-recognized grounds for impeaching the 
credibility of a witness.  For example, a party may show that a witness is 
biased in favor of or against a particular party, that the witness lacks 
competency because of a mental or sensory incapacity or a lack of personal 
knowledge, or that the witness has made a prior statement which is 
inconsistent with the witness’s testimony.2  Another recognized method for 
impeaching the credibility of a witness is to demonstrate that the witness 
possesses a character trait for untruthfulness.  An attack on a witness’s 
character for truthfulness is designed to demonstrate that the witness is by 
disposition untruthful and therefore not credible as a witness in any case.3  It 
is this impeachment attack that raises difficult questions as to the proper 
method for proving a witness’s character for truthfulness and the extent to 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, 2016, 
Montclair State University.  I would like to express my gratitude to my faculty advisor, Denis 
McLaughlin, for his guidance and support in the writing of this Comment.  
 1  FED. R. EVID. 607.  New Jersey Rule of Evidence 607 similarly authorizes and extends 
the right to impeach to the party calling the witness.  See N.J. R. EVID. 607 (“Except as 
otherwise provided by Rules 405 and 608, for the purpose of impairing or supporting the 
credibility of a witness, any party including the party calling the witness may examine the 
witness and introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue of credibility . . . .”).  
 2  ROGER PARK & TOM LININGER, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: 
IMPEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION § 2.1 (2017).  
 3  CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 6111 (2d ed. 2017).   
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which untruthful character evidence may be shown through cross-
examination or through the introduction of extrinsic evidence. 
Specifically, the question arises whether, and in what manner, a witness 
may be impeached with specific instances of non-conviction misconduct that 
are probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness.  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in State v. Scott, a case which 
squarely presented the division between FRE 608 and New Jersey Rule of 
Evidence (N.J.R.E.) 608 and triggered two divergent concurring opinions as 
to the proper course for New Jersey law going forward.4 
With respect to impeachment of a witness’s character for truthfulness, 
both FRE 608(a) and N.J.R.E. 608(a) expressly provide that a party may 
attack or support a witness’s character for truthfulness through the 
introduction of character witnesses who may testify in the form of reputation 
or opinion as to the witness’s character for truthfulness.5  In addition, FRE 
608(b) and N.J.R.E. 608(a) both prohibit the introduction of extrinsic 
evidence to prove specific instances of conduct in order to attack or support 
a witness’s character for truthfulness.6 
FRE 608(b) and N.J.R.E. 608(a) diverge, however, on whether inquiry 
on cross-examination may be permitted as to specific instances of conduct 
that are probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness.  FRE 608(b) 
expressly provides that the court may allow such inquiry on cross-
examination,7 whereas N.J.R.E. 608(a) prohibits such inquiry.8  N.J.R.E. 
608(a) provides that “a trait of character cannot be proved by specific 
instances of conduct”9 and New Jersey courts interpret this provision to 
prohibit not only the introduction of extrinsic evidence of specific instances 
of conduct, but also inquiry as to such conduct on cross-examination.10  FRE 
608(b) provides in pertinent part: 
Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic 
evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a 
witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s 
 
 4  State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 336 (N.J. 2017).  
 5  FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (“A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by 
testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character . . . .”); N.J. R. 
EVID. 608(a) (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the 
form of opinion or reputation, provided, however, that the evidence relates only to the witness’ 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . .”). 
 6  See FED. R. EVID. 608(b); N.J. R. EVID. 608(a).  
 7  FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
 8  N.J. R. EVID. 608(a) 
 9  Id. 
 10  State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 336 (N.J. 2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring) (“N.J.R.E. 
608, however, bars not only the use of extrinsic evidence but also cross-examination into 
specific instances of misconduct.”).  
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character for truthfulness.  But the court may, on cross-
examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative 
of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of: (1) the 
witness; or (2) another witness whose character the witness being 
cross-examined has testified about.11 
N.J.R.E. 608(a) provides: 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by 
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, provided, however, 
that the evidence relates only to the witness’ character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and provided further that evidence 
of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the 
witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation 
evidence or otherwise. Except as otherwise provided by Rule 
609 and by paragraph (b) of this rule, a trait of character cannot 
be proved by specific instances of conduct.12 
New Jersey’s formulation falls in the minority approach with respect to 
the use of specific instances of conduct to impeach a witness’s character for 
truthfulness.13  Only a few other states have a complete ban on the use of 
specific instances of conduct.14  This departure from FRE 608(b) became the 
focal point of debate between Chief Justice Rabner and Justice Albin in State 
v. Scott. 
In State v. Scott, the defendant, Thomas Scott, faced possession of 
heroin charges.15  At trial, “[h]e argued that he did not knowingly possess the 
heroin because someone else placed it in his jeans pocket before he put them 
on.”16  Defendant planned to have his mother, Darlene Barbella, testify in 
support of this contention.17  Barbella was going “to testify that she found 
the heroin in defendant’s apartment” lying on a table next to “defendant’s 
cousin and known drug user, Jordan Scott,” and “placed the heroin in the 
pocket of a pair of jeans she believed belonged to Jordan.”18  To impeach 
her, the State planned to question Barbella about two prior instances where 
she allegedly lied to the police to exonerate her son, the defendant.19  The 
trial court ruled that the State’s evidence was admissible and as a result, 
defendant did not call Barbella but instead called another witness “to testify 
 
 11  FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
 12  N.J. R. EVID. 608(a) (emphasis added). 
 13  Scott, 163 A.3d at 338 (Rabner, C.J., concurring).   
 14  See FLA. STAT. § 90.609 (1978); ILL R. EVID. 608; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-422(d) 
(1964); MASS. GUIDE EVID. 608(b); OR. R. EVID. 608; TEX. R. EVID. 608(b). 
 15  Scott, 163 A.3d at 328. 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id.  
 19  Id. 
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to the same events.”20 
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the 
evidence would have been admissible at trial.21  In holding that the trial court 
abused its discretion by ruling that the proposed impeachment testimony was 
admissible, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument that 
Rule 608 provided grounds for admissibility.22  The court noted that “Rule 
608 explicitly excludes specific instances of conduct as a means of proving 
a character for untruthfulness, permitting only opinion or reputation 
evidence.”23 
This finding by the court regarding the application of N.J.R.E. 608 
prompted concurring opinions from Chief Justice Rabner and Justice Albin 
debating whether New Jersey’s bar on the use of specific instances of 
conduct to impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness is still a proper 
approach.24  Chief Justice Rabner argued that the outcome of the case 
highlights the problems posed by the current rule.25  As a result, the Chief 
Justice proposed that it is time to consider whether N.J.R.E. 608 should be 
revised to fall in line with the majority of states and its federal counterpart 
FRE 608.26  Chief Justice Rabner highlighted the disadvantages of New 
Jersey’s rule and called upon the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on 
the Rules of Evidence to consider the question for “a simple reason: the topic 
relates directly to the jury’s search for the truth, which a system of justice 
should foster.”27 
In response, Justice Albin argued that no justification for altering the 
current version exists.28  Justice Albin explained that the current Rule is in 
line with the development of New Jersey’s common law, which has always 
barred such evidence because its probative value “is outweighed by the 
potential prejudice of diverting jurors from the central issues in a case.”29  
Justice Albin posited that while New Jersey’s rules may not be perfect, they 
“accommodate two important goals: the search for truth and the need for 
fairness in [the] criminal and civil justice system.”30 
State v. Scott highlighted some of the problems and dangers N.J.R.E. 
608 has created, and presented the opportunity to assess New Jersey’s 
 
 20  Id. 
 21  Scott, 163 A.3d. at 330.  
 22  Id. at 333. 
 23  Id.   
 24  Id. at 335 (Rabner, C.J., concurring); Id. 340–41 (Albin, J., concurring). 
 25  Id. at 339 (Rabner, C.J., concurring).   
 26  Id. at 340. 
 27  Scott, 163 A.3d at 340. 
 28  Id. at 341 (Albin, J., concurring).   
 29  Id. at 340.   
 30  Id. at 341.   
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approach and determine whether change is needed.  This Comment will 
examine the arguments set forth in the concurring opinions in State v. Scott 
and consider whether New Jersey should amend N.J.R.E. 608(a) and adopt 
the majority approach and allow, on cross-examination, the use of specific 
instances of conduct that are probative of the witness’s character for 
truthfulness.  Part II will review New Jersey’s approach by examining the 
history and development of N.J.R.E. 608 from common law to its current 
formulation and review how the rule is applied with regard to specific 
instances of conduct.  Part III will examine the majority approach with a 
focus on the formulation and application of the federal analogue to N.J.R.E. 
608, FRE 608.  Part IV will assess the potential dangers of allowing specific 
instances of conduct and examine the arguments and counter arguments 
regarding how the majority approach addresses these issues.  Part V will 
examine New Jersey’s options to address this issue and amend the current 
rule.  Overall, this Comment will argue that New Jersey’s current 
formulation of Rule 608 does not adequately address the use of specific 
instances of conduct.  While apprehension for allowing the use of specific 
instances of conduct is valid, a complete bar raises equally valid concerns; 
adoption of a rule that takes a restrictive approach will provide an adequate 
compromise that properly addresses the issues raised on both sides. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF N.J.R.E. 608 
New Jersey is one of seven states that have a complete bar on the use 
of specific instances of conduct to impeach a witness’s character for 
truthfulness.31  This approach follows the New Jersey common-law rule. 
Early cases made clear that an attempt to impeach the character of a witness 
was limited to the witness’s reputation in the community for truth and 
veracity.32  For example, in an 1883 case, Paul v. Paul,33 the court explained 
 
 31  See supra text accompanying notes 13–14.  
 32  See King v. Ruckman, 20 N.J. Eq. 316, 357 (Ch. 1869) (“But the greatest portion of 
the testimony for King on this point is such as cannot be regarded.  It is evidently founded 
upon the fact that Ruckman has been guilty of very improper conduct with regard to the cattle 
of his neighbors, [and] is a troublesome, litigious man . . . . [s]uch witnesses are necessarily 
produced when they alone know or witnessed facts required to be proved; but when selected 
to give character to a witness, are not of much value.  The only testimony allowed in such 
case is as to the general reputation of the witness impeached, in the neighborhood, for truth 
and veracity . . . .”), rev’d, 21 N.J. Eq. 599 (1870); see also Atwood v. Impson, 20 N.J. Eq. 
150, 157 (Ch. 1869) (“[Particular transactions are] not the evidence which the law permits, or 
should permit, to affect the credibility of a witness . . . .  The object of the law is to show the 
character of the witness as to telling the truth; general reputation in the community where he 
is known, is the test and the only test which the law allows as to character.”); State v. 
Hendrick, 56 A. 247, 249 (N.J. 1903) (“A witness may be discredited by evidence attacking 
his character for truth and veracity but not by the proof of particular independent facts, though 
bearing upon the question of veracity.”).   
 33  37 N.J. Eq. 23 (Ch. 1883). 
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that unless character is the central issue, such as rape, or breach of promise, 
“proof that a witness was a common prostitute, offered to impeach her 
testimony, [wa]s incompetent.”34  The court cited La Beau v. People, for the 
general rule that: 
inquiries as to particular acts of immorality [are] inadmissible . . . 
it would be impossible for the witness to be prepared for a defense 
of particular acts, and it would lead to an indefinite number of 
issues.  Therefore, on an issue upon the character of a witness, it 
cannot be allowed to inquire into particular facts.35 
Thus, New Jersey courts recognized the potential dangers of allowing 
inquiries into specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character for 
truthfulness and as a result adopted a rule barring the use of such evidence. 
In State v. De Paola, decided in 1950, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
continued to apply this common-law rule.36  The defendant was charged with 
murder.37  At trial, the prosecution cross-examined the defendant regarding 
prior liquor-license applications in which the defendant allegedly falsely 
swore to questions on the applications while under oath.38  The prosecution 
aimed to use the specific instances of conduct to show that if the defendant 
had lied on multiple applications, he was lying now and his testimony could 
not be trusted.39  The defendant was compelled to answer the question and 
admitted that each year from 1941 to 1948, he had lied on the liquor-license 
applications.40 
On appeal from his conviction, the defendant argued that the trial court 
erred in allowing this line of questioning on cross-examination.41  The State 
argued that the ruling was within the trial court’s discretion and the 
challenged evidence was permissible to show defendant’s lack of veracity.42  
The court found little merit to the State’s theory, noting that there was no 
authority cited in support of its contention.43 
The court examined New Jersey case law regarding the approach to this 
issue and found that New Jersey had adopted a “rule which excludes the 
proof of independent facts to discredit a witness.”44  The court noted that the 
acts referred to were not connected to the charge upon which the defendant 
 
 34  Id. at 26. 
 35  33 How. Pr. 66, 72 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1865). 
 36  73 A.2d 564 (N.J. 1950). 
 37  Id. at 566.  
 38  Id. at 568. 
 39  Id. at 569 
 40  Id.  
 41  Id.  
 42  De Paola, 73 A.2d at 569. 
 43  Id. at 569.  
 44  Id. at 570 (quoting State v. Hendrick, 56 A. 247, 249 (N.J. 1903)).   
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was being tried and were unrelated to the central issues of the case.45  
Moreover, the defendant had not been convicted of perjury or false swearing 
by reason of his liquor license misconduct.46  In light of these findings, the 
court held that the admission of the testimony was reversible error.47 
De Paola and the early New Jersey cases illustrate the rule regarding 
inquiry into specific instances of conduct that New Jersey courts had 
developed.  Prior bad acts that did not result in a conviction that were 
probative of a witness’s character for untruthfulness could not be inquired 
into on cross-examination.  Some of the underlying rationales were that such 
testimony was collateral to the main issues of the case and it would be 
unreasonable to expect that a defendant-witness could be prepared to defend 
against possible questioning into any area of the witness’s life.48 
New Jersey formally codified the prohibition on specific instances of 
conduct in 1967 under N.J.R.E. 22(d), which provided, “as affecting the 
credibility of a witness . . . evidence of specific instances of his conduct, 
relevant only as tending to prove a trait of his character, shall be 
inadmissible.”49  When N.J.R.E. 22 was prepared it was “representative of 
current New Jersey [common] law.”50 
In the early 1980s, the New Jersey Supreme Court appointed a 
Committee on the Rules of Evidence to survey the feasibility of amending 
the New Jersey evidence rules.51  The Committee was to consider “whether 
or to what extent New Jersey should adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence.”52  
In 1991, the Committee recommended a sweeping change in the New Jersey 
evidence scheme and the new rules went into effect in 1993.53  The revised 
rules constituted an amalgamation of the federal and then-current New Jersey 
evidence rules, following federal numeration and arrangement.54 
 
 45  Id. at 571. 
 46  Id. at 569. 
 47  Id. at 571. 
 48  See, e.g., Ippolito v. Turp, 19 A.2d 782, 784 (N.J. 1940) (“Every man is supposed to 
be capable of supporting his general reputation whenever it is attacked but not to meet specific 
transactions not an issue in the cause.”).  
 49  State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 344 (N.J. 2017) (Albin, J., concurring) (quoting N.J. R. 
EVID. 22).  
 50  REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE 71 (1963) 
(citing De Paola, 73 A.2d at 564)).  
 51  Alma G. Lopez, New Jersey’s Other-Crimes Rules and the Evidence Committee’s 
Abrogation of Almost Two Hundred Years of Judicial Precedent, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 394, 
423 (1993). 
 52  Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence, 129 N.J. L.J. 1, 1 
(1991) [hereinafter Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee]. 
 53  Lopez, supra note 51, at 425–26 (citing Stephen W. Townsend, Esq., Notices to the 
Bar: Supreme Court of New Jersey Revisions to the Rules of Evidence, 134 N.J. L.J. 798, 798 
(1993)). 
 54  Id. at 423. 
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New N.J.R.E. 608 incorporated the limiting principles of N.J.R.E. 22(d) 
with respect to admission of evidence of a trait of character for truthfulness 
or untruthfulness when offered under N.J.R.E. 20 to affect the credibility of 
a witness.55  The Committee noted that N.J.R.E. 608 followed the 
formulation of FRE 608; however, the Committee rejected the provision in 
paragraph (b) of the federal rule that allowed for the use of specific instances 
of conduct on cross-examination.56  The Committee believed that this 
rejection “retains present New Jersey practice” noting that “[N.J.R.E.], 
followed by this rule, prohibited ‘specific instances of conduct’ proof in any 
form if introduced to prove a trait of character.”57  Further, the Committee 
believed that N.J.R.E. 607 already “afford[ed] sufficient scope for the 
effective impeachment of credibility.”58  Thus, New Jersey maintained its 
approach to specific instances of conduct in rejecting the federal formulation. 
In 2004, a case came before the New Jersey Supreme Court that forced 
the court to consider whether the general prohibition on specific conduct 
evidence could be subject to an exception in a particular context.59  In State 
v. Guenther, in an opinion authored by Justice Albin, the court had to decide 
“whether the credibility of a witness who had accused a defendant of sexual 
abuse may be impeached by evidence that [the witness] made a prior false 
criminal accusation.”60  Defendant was accused by his stepdaughter, D.F., of 
sexually abusing her over the course of five years.61  During trial, defendant 
discovered documents revealing that D.F. admitted that she falsely accused 
her neighbor of sexually abusing her.62  The defense requested permission to 
cross-examine D.F. regarding this prior false accusation and in the event that 
D.F.  denied making the false accusation, defense stated his intent to impeach 
D.F. with extrinsic evidence.63  The trial court denied this request and ruled 
that “the purported false accusation was ‘irrelevant’ and ‘extremely 
collateral’ and, therefore, inappropriate for consideration by the jury.”64  The 
defendant was convicted of sexual assault.65 
On appeal, the Appellate Division remanded for the determination of 
whether D.F. made the false accusation and, if so, whether it was false.66  The 
 
 55  Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee, supra note 52, at 25.   
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  State v. Guenther, 854 A.2d 308, 309–10 (N.J. 2004).  
 60  Id. at 309. 
 61  Id. at 310.  
 62  Id. at 309. 
 63  Id. at 310.  
 64  Id.  
 65  Guenther, 854 A.2d at 309.  
 66  Id at 313. 
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court directed that if the trial court found that the accusation was made but 
determined that the evidence was inadmissible, the verdict would stand.67  If 
the panel found, however, that D.F. made the false accusation and it was 
admissible, a new trial would be necessary.68  The State petitioned for 
certification arguing that the decision was contrary to N.J.R.E. 608 and the 
New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to address the issue.69 
The court had to determine whether the common-law principle 
embodied in N.J.R.E. 608 had “continuing vitality when applied to evidence 
of a victim-witness’s prior false accusation.”70  The court traced the 
development of the rule noting that, “it was not a lack of relevance that gave 
rise to the rule prohibiting” the use of specific instances of conduct to attack 
the witness’s character for truthfulness, “but the ‘auxiliary policies’ 
regarding unfairness to the witness, confusion of issues, and undue 
consumption of time.”71  Thus, according to the court, these auxiliary 
policies illustrate that the bar on the use of specific-instance character 
evidence was adopted “for pragmatic reasons associated with the efficient 
and orderly presentation of a trial.”72  The court explained, however, that 
when these “auxiliary policies” do not apply, “the rationale for the exclusion 
of such evidence no longer exists.”73 
With these principles in mind, the court then addressed whether limited 
circumstances warrant an exception to N.J.R.E. 608.74  The court noted that 
various jurisdictions across the country have addressed this issue and in 
sexual crime cases have permitted cross-examination of a witness-accuser 
who made prior false accusations involving a sexual crime.75  In light of this, 
the court concluded that in a criminal case involving impeachment of a 
victim-witness whose credibility was the central issue in the case, “a 
defendant has the right to show that a victim-witness has made a prior false 
criminal accusation for the purpose of challenging that witness’s 
credibility.”76 
 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. at 313-14. 
 70  Id. at 315. 
 71  Guenther, 854 A.2d at 315 (citing 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 979 (Chadbourn 
rev.1970)). 
 72  Id.  
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. at 318.  
 75  Id. at 310–323.  
 76  Id. at 322, 324 (noting that the holding is limited to “criminal case[s] that involve[] the 
impeachment of a victim-witness whose credibility was the central issue in the case”).  The 
exception recognized by the court here is reflected in N.J. R. EVID. 608(b):  
The credibility of a witness in a criminal case may be attacked by 
evidence that the witness made a prior false accusation against any person 
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The court outlined the proper procedure for determining whether the 
evidence should be admitted as well as the relevant factors to consider, 
stressing that courts must ensure that “testimony on the subject does not 
become a second trial, eclipsing the trial of the crimes charged.”77  The court 
emphasized that its ruling was not creating a new rule of evidence, but 
“merely carving out a narrow exception to [N.J.R.E. 608]” to allow for the 
introduction of relevant evidence that may affect jurors’ estimation of the 
credibility of a key witness.78  Thus, the court concluded this limited 
exception will enhance the “fairness and truth-seeking function of a trial,”79 
and is consistent with the rationale underpinning the rule.80  Guenther 
illustrates New Jersey’s current formulation of the rule with the now-added 
exception.  Moreover, Guenther summarized the continuing rationale for 
maintaining the bar on specific instances of conduct but also outlined the 
circumstances that would render the rule and its underlying policies no 
longer necessary. 
III. MAJORITY APPROACH TO IMPEACHMENT OF A WITNESS’S 
CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS THROUGH SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF 
CONDUCT 
This Part turns to the majority approach regarding specific conduct 
evidence in the context of attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness and 
how the rule is applied.  FRE 608(b) is representative of the majority 
approach.  A majority of states follow the federal approach and permit cross-
examination into specific instances of conduct if they are probative of the 
witness’s character for truthfulness.81 
 
of a crime similar to the crime with which defendant is charged if the 
judge preliminarily determines, by a hearing pursuant to Rule 104(a), that 
the witness knowingly made the prior false accusation. 
N.J. R. EVID. 608(b). 
 77  Guenther, 854 A.2d at 324.   
 78  Id. at 325.  
 79  Id.   
 80  Id. at 322.  
 81  Twelve states track the language from the current version of FRE 608(b) as amended 
in 2011. See ARIZ. R. EVID. 608(b); DEL. R. EVID. 608(b); IDAHO R. EVID. 608(b); IOWA R. 
EVID. 608(b); ME. R. EVID. 608(b); MISS. R. EVID. 608(b); N.H. R. EVID. 608(b); N.M. R. 
EVID. 11-608(B); N.D. R. EVID. 608(b); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-608(b) (2016); UTAH 
R. EVID. 608(b); W. VA. R. EVID. 608(b).  Six states track the language from the version of 
FRE 608(b) as amended in 2003.  See COLO. R. EVID. 608(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-6-608(b) 
(2013); MINN. R. EVID. 608(b); OHIO R. EVID. 608(B); TENN. R. EVID. 608(b); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 906.08(2) (2018).  Thirteen states track the language from the original 1975 version.  
See ARK. R. EVID. 608(b); KY. R. EVID. 608(b); MICH. R. EVID. 608(b); MONT. R. EVID. 
608(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-608(2) (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.085(3) (1975); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 8C-1 (1983); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2608(B) (1978); R.I. R. EVID. 608(b); S.C. R. 
EVID. 608(b); VT. R. EVID. 608(b); WASH. R. EVID. 608(b); WYO. R. EVID. 608(b).  Six states 
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FRE 608 envisions three ways of showing that a witness is by character 
or disposition either truthful or untruthful: (1) by testimony as to reputation;82 
(2) by testimony in the form of opinion;83 and (3) by evidence of specific 
instances of conduct.84  With respect to specific instances of conduct, FRE 
608(b) uses the verb “may” in this setting, making it clear that the matter is 
left to the discretion of the court.85  This raises two questions: (a) what 
general considerations govern a court’s exercise of discretion under 
subdivision (b); and (b) when is specific-instance character evidence 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness?86 
A. What Governs the Court’s Exercise of Discretion? 
While the current text of FRE 608(b) does not explicitly provide 
guidance, the drafters made clear in the Advisory Committee Notes that FRE 
403 and FRE 611 are relevant to the analysis.87  Thus, courts recognize that 
FRE 403 and FRE 611 identify the principles controlling the exercise of 
 
adopted only the latter part of the rule, FRE 608(b)(2); they permit cross-examination of a 
character witness with specific instances of conduct about the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of the underlying witness.  See ALA. R. EVID. 608(b); ARK. R. EVID. 608(b); 
IND. R. EVID. 608(b); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 608(B) (1989); PA. R. EVID. 608(b); VA. R. 
EVID. 2:608.  Connecticut, Missouri, and New York do not track the language of the federal 
rule, but these states follow the federal approach and permit specific instances of conduct to 
attack a witness’s character for truthfulness. See CONN. CODE EVID. § 6–6(b); Mitchell v. 
Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 670 (Mo. 2010) (“[L]ong-standing Missouri law holds that the 
person may be asked about specific instances of his or her own conduct that speak to his or 
her own character for truth or veracity, even where the issue inquired about is not material to 
the substantive issues in the case.”); People v Smith, 27 N.Y.3d 652, 660, 662 (2016) 
(“[W]itnesses—and indeed, even a testifying defendant—may be cross-examined on ‘prior 
specific criminal, vicious or immoral conduct,’ provided that ‘the nature of such conduct or 
the circumstances in which it occurred bear logically and reasonably on the issue of 
credibility.’” (quoting People v. Sandoval, 314 N.E.2d 413, 417 (1974))). Maryland also 
allows cross-examination about a witness’s prior conduct that is probative of untruthfulness, 
when the questioner, if challenged, “establishes a reasonable factual basis” outside the jury’s 
presence.  MD. R. EVID. 5-608(b).  Hawaii permits cross-examination about specific instances 
of a witness’s conduct, if probative of untruthfulness, and affords judges discretion to allow 
the use of extrinsic evidence.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-608(b) (1993).  California permits 
evidence of specific instances of conduct to challenge a witness’s credibility in criminal but 
not civil cases.  See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; CAL. EVID. CODE § 787 (West 1967); People v. 
Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 640–41 (Cal. 1989). 
 82  FED. R. EVID. 608(a). 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. 608(b). 
 85  Id. (“But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they 
are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
 86  WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6118.   
 87  FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules (“[T]he 
overriding protection of Rule 403 requires that probative value not be outweighed by danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, and that of Rule 611 bars 
harassment and undue embarrassment.”).  
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discretion under FRE 608(b).88  These rules require the court to balance the 
probative value of specific-instance character evidence against the potential 
dangers and costs of that evidence,89 and to exercise control over the “mode 
and order of examining witnesses.”90 
Some of the general factors courts consider in this analysis are: (1) 
whether the witness’s testimony is crucial or unimportant; (2) the relevancy 
of the act of misconduct to truthfulness; (3) the nearness or remoteness of 
the misconduct to the time of trial; (4) whether the matter inquired into is 
likely to lead to time-consuming and distracting explanations on cross-
examination; and (5) whether there will be unfair humiliation of the witness 
and undue prejudice to the party which called the witness.91  It is further 
recognized that courts have broad discretion in making this determination 
and a trial judge’s ruling can be overturned only on a finding of abuse of 
discretion.92 
For example, in United States v. Bunchan, the court of appeals 
addressed whether the trial court abused its discretion in limiting inquiry into 
specific instances of conduct on cross-examination.93  The defendant sought 
to cross-examine a government witness about pending criminal charges 
 
 88  See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6118, at 101; United States v. Seymour, 472 
F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 608(b) is explicit that the determination of whether to 
allow specific instances of conduct to be used to challenge a witness’s reputation for 
truthfulness is committed to the discretion of the district judge, and Rule 403 establishes the 
standard for the exercise of the judge’s discretion in evidentiary matters . . . .”). 
 89  See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“[T]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence.”); see also United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 920 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (finding probative value of evidence concerning character for veracity must 
outweigh danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading jury).  
 90  See FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (“The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode 
and order of examining witnesses . . . so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for 
determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or 
undue embarrassment.”). 
 91  CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 41, at 93 (5th ed. 1999); 
see also United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 719 (4th Cir. 1981) (“[P]roper factors to be 
employed in measuring the scope of cross-examination [are]: the importance of the testimony 
to the government’s case, the relevance of the conduct to the witness’s truthfulness, and the 
danger of prejudice, confusion, or delay raised by evidence sought to be adduced.”); Telum, 
Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 839 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding the probative 
value of evidence that one of the defendant’s agents embezzled $40,000 in connection with 
the plaintiff’s lease was greatly outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice). 
 92  See 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 608.02 (2017); see also United States v. Ortiz, 5 F.3d 288, 290–91 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding 
no abuse of discretion in excluding, as irrelevant, personnel file of government agent offered 
for impeachment and finding that Rule 608(b) expressly provided that instances of conduct 
may be inquired into on cross-examination “in the discretion of the court” and that the “district 
court has broad discretion in assessing admissibility of any evidence”). 
 93  580 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2009).   
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against the witness for battery of a child and indecent assault .94  The 
defendant argued that FRE 608(b) permitted the inquiry because it concerned 
a specific instance of conduct relevant to the witness’s character for 
truthfulness.95  The trial court permitted the defendant to elicit, through 
cross-examination of the witness, that there were state court charges 
currently pending against him.96  But the trial court ordered that he could not 
inquire into the nature of the charges and found such an inquiry “far too 
prejudicial under [FRE] 403.”97 
The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
restriction of the cross-examination of the witness.98  Citing FRE 403, the 
court of appeals noted that the ruling allowed the defendant to raise the 
possibility that the witness would receive lighter treatment on the state 
charges if he testified favorably for the government.99  The court of appeals 
found, however, that exposing the nature of the pending state charges was 
not necessary to present such evidence.100  The court of appeals explained 
that FRE 608(b) “only permits inquiry into prior conduct if the conduct is 
probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness . . . .”101  The court of 
appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that “the nature of the sexual assault charges [were] not sufficiently probative 
of [the witness’s] character for truthfulness to outweigh the serious danger 
of prejudicing the jury against him . . . .”102 
Bunchan illustrates the role of FRE 403 in the determination of whether 
inquiry into specific instances of conduct on cross-examination will be 
permitted.  This approach allows trial judges to balance the interests on both 
sides and take into account particular facts and circumstances of the case 
before the court.  Moreover, as in this case, it allows the admittance of the 
evidence where it is probative of a witness’s character for truthfulness but 
can limit the inquiry so as to preclude any of the dangers listed in FRE 403. 
B. What Conduct is Probative of Truthfulness? 
FRE 608(b) provides that a court may allow specific instances of 
conduct “if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness.”103  The critical question, therefore, is what kinds of conduct 
 
 94  Id.  
 95  Id. 
 96  Id. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Bunchan, 580 F.3d at 71.   
 100  Id.   
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. 
 103  FED. R. EVID. 608. 
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are probative of truthfulness.  Courts have taken three basic approaches to 
determine whether certain conduct is relevant to the witness’s character for 
truthfulness.104  Under the broad view, virtually any conduct indicating bad 
character relates to untruthfulness.105  Under the middle view, “behavior 
seeking personal advantage by taking from others in violation of their rights” 
may be admissible if committed under circumstances reflecting on 
veracity.106  Under the narrow view, conduct is admissible only if it directly 
involves falsehood or deception, such as forgery or perjury.107 
The broad view’s expansive scope of possible acts that indicate bad 
behavior opens up the witness’s entire life to probing, leaving the witness 
vulnerable to embarrassment and abuse.108  Recognizing these difficulties 
and potential for abuse, most modern decisions avoid adopting this view.109  
Most courts tend to fall in either the middle view or narrow view as they 
recognize the dangers the broad view presents and insist on closer links 
between the conduct and veracity.110 
In United States v. Manske, the court of appeals had to decide 
whether FRE 608(b) allowed cross-examination concerning a prosecution 
witness’s threats of violence which were intended to influence the 
truthfulness of other witnesses’ testimony.111  The trial court did not permit 
inquiry into the prior instances of conduct, holding that such evidence was 
irrelevant.112  Further, it noted that FRE 608(b) did not allow the use of the 
threat evidence to cross-examine the witness because such evidence did not 
go to character for truthfulness “but rather, to the character [for] violence and 
[the witness’s] threatening nature.”113 
On appeal, the court of appeals began by discussing the three 
approaches in determining whether this conduct was probative of 
truthfulness or untruthfulness.114  The court of appeals ultimately adopted the 
middle view.115  The court explained that under this view, specific-instance 
character evidence is admissible when, although “the specific instance of 
conduct may not facially appear relevant to truthfulness, closer inspection 
 
 104  3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6:33 (4th 
ed. 2018). 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. (“[V]irtually no modern decisions seem to take [the broad] view.”).  
 110  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 104, § 6:33.  
 111  United States v. Manske, 186 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 112  Id.  
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. at 775.  
 115  Id. 
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reveals that it bears on that issue.”116  The court of appeals noted that this 
more flexible standard under the middle view is a wise approach.117  This 
standard allows questions that would not be embraced by the narrow view, 
which precludes evidence that may not facially appear to be relevant to 
truthfulness.118 
Applying this approach, the court of appeals held that FRE 608(b) did 
not limit inquiry only to conduct involving fraud or deceit but permits cross-
examination into “acts that ‘reflect adversely on a [person’s] honesty and 
integrity.’”119  Thus, the court held that “[t]hreatening to cause physical harm 
to a person who proposes to testify against you is . . . probative of 
truthfulness . . . .”120  The court of appeals noted that the “trial court 
construed the threat evidence too narrowly” by perceiving the threats as 
probative only of violence.121  The violent conduct, however, was a proper 
subject of inquiry on cross-examination because under the circumstances the 
threatening conduct was aimed at concealing or distorting the truth, thus 
implicating the witness’s character for truthfulness.122 
While these categories are recognized, courts generally confine their 
analyses to the specific conduct raised before them and assess, on a case-by-
case basis, whether the conduct is probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness.123  For example, the court of appeals in United States v. Leake 
considered whether the trial court erred when it refused to allow defense 
counsel to cross-examine a witness regarding “various fraudulent financial 
schemes.”124  In interpreting the scope of FRE 608 and, more specifically, 
what matters can be raised on cross-examination, the court of appeals found 
that FRE 608 “authorizes inquiry only into instances of misconduct that are 
‘clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,’ such as perjury, fraud, 
swindling, forgery, bribery, and embezzlement.”125 
The court of appeals held that the instances of conduct defense counsel 
intended to elicit on cross-examination were “probative of [the 
witness’s] truthfulness.”126  The witness’s conduct included “obtaining 
money under false pretenses,” defrauding an innkeeper, and writing checks 
 
 116  Id. 
 117  Manske, 186 F.3d at 775. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. (quoting Varhol v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1567 (7th Cir. 
1990)). 
 120  Id.  
 121  Id. at 776. 
 122  Id. 
 123  WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6118. 
 124  United States v. Leake, 642 F.2d 715, 718 (4th Cir. 1981). 
 125  Id. (quoting 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 982 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)). 
 126  Id. at 719. 
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that “had been returned for insufficient funds.”127  In addition, “numerous 
default judgments had been entered against the witness in civil actions 
seeking repayment of loans,” and the witness, or firms that he controlled, 
had entered into contracts and received payment, but never completed the 
work under the contracts.128  The court concluded that such conduct 
“certainly establish[ed] a pattern of fraudulent activity that, if revealed, 
would have placed [the witness’s] credibility in question.”129 
Further examples of particular conduct that many courts have 
concluded is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness include conduct that 
consists of acts clearly implicating veracity such as insurance fraud,130 lying 
in court,131 tax fraud,132 using a false name or identity,133 lying repeatedly,134 
lying on a credit card application,135 lying on a job application,136 lying on a 
license application,137 bank fraud,138 and bribery.139  Conversely, courts have 
 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. 
 129  Id. 
 130  See United States v. Amahia, 825 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding cross-
examination concerning specific facts of insurance fraud). 
 131  See United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Nothing could 
be more probative of a witness’s character for untruthfulness than evidence that the witness 
has previously lied under oath.”). 
 132  See Chnapkova v. Koh, 985 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding evidence that witness 
had not filed tax returns for eight years was a proper subject on cross-examination as it bore 
directly on her credibility as a witness), abrogated by United States v. Lanham, 541 F. App’x 
34 (2013). 
 133  See United States v. Mansaw, 714 F.2d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 1983) (“A witness’[s] use 
of false names or false identities is a proper subject of cross-examination under [FRE] 608.”); 
United States v. Reid, 634 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming cross-examination about 
statements made in a letter in which the witness admitted to falsifying his name, his 
occupation, and the name of his business). 
 134  See United States v. Jones, 900 F.2d 512, 520–21 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming cross-
examination regarding false statements on applications for employment, apartment, driver’s 
license, loan, and membership in an association). 
 135  See United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding no abuse of 
discretion in allowing cross-examination of a witness regarding false credit card applications 
“to show a general lack of credibility”).  
 136  See United States v. Howard, 774 F.2d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming inquiry on 
cross-examination regarding false statements the witness made on two employment 
applications because the witness’s honesty or lack thereof on the applications was “plainly 
probative” of his character for truthfulness). 
 137  See United States v. Carlin, 698 F.2d 1133, 1137 (11th Cir. 1983) (permitting cross-
examination of witness as to the “truthfulness of his answer on his verified application” for 
used car dealer licenses). 
 138  See United States v. Chevalier, 1 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding cross-
examination into alleged bank fraud was proper because such conduct “constitutes specific 
instances of conduct probative of truthfulness”). 
 139  See United States v. Wilson, 985 F.2d 348, 352 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming cross-
examination regarding prior acts of bribery because “bribery is probative of a witness’[s] 
character for truthfulness”).  
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generally found that conduct is not probative of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness where the conduct consisted of marital infidelity,140 
prostitution,141 drug-related acts,142 domestic abuse,143 child abuse,144 violent 
crimes,145 arson,146 murder,147 parole violations,148 manslaughter,149 and 
assault.150 
Thus, whether conduct is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness is 
largely left to the discretion of the court.  Courts tend to look toward conduct 
that clearly speaks to veracity, and if presented with conduct that is not on 
 
 140  See United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding a letter 
husband sent to female neighbor asking to meet up may suggest he “was not being entirely 
candid with his wife,” but it does not “directly relate to [the witness’s] truthfulness and 
honesty”); United States v. Thiongo, 344 F.3d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 2003) (evidence that the witness 
bore one man’s child while married to another was not probative of untruthfulness). 
 141  See United States v. Smith, 831 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing FED. R. EVID. 
608(b)) (holding no abuse of discretion in not permitting questions on cross-examination that 
witness dressed as a prostitute or engaged in prostitution as it would have little relevance to 
her credibility as a witness). 
 142  See United States v. Pickard, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 (D. Kan. 2002) (“Drug use 
is not admissible under Rule 608(b) because it is not probative of truthfulness.”); Elliott v. 
Aspen Brokers, Ltd., 811 F. Supp. 586, 590 (D. Colo. 1993) (“Courts generally agree that a 
witness’[s] past drug activity is not probative of his character for truthfulness and routinely 
exclude evidence introduced for this purpose.”).  
 143  See Miller v. United States, 135 F.3d 1254, 1256 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding trial 
court’s decision to deny inquiry into instances of domestic violence because such acts are not 
probative of a witness’s propensity for truthfulness).  
 144  See Starling v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 203 F.R.D. 468, 484 (D. Kan. 2001) (finding 
evidence of prior charge of child abuse, which did not result in a conviction, was not a proper 
subject on cross-examination under FRE 608(b)).  
 145  See United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding violent crimes 
are irrelevant to a witness’s character for truthfulness); United States v. Peña, 978 F. Supp. 
2d 254, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (prohibiting cross-examination about a witness’s violent acts 
toward women and finding no reason to depart from the “general rule” that evidence of acts 
relating to violence are properly excluded as having insufficient bearing on a witness’s 
credibility). 
 146  See United States v. Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992, 996 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[Witness] might have 
been cross-examined under Rule 608(b) as to prior instances of forgery or perjury; but 
soliciting arson, although showing bad character generally, is not ‘probative of . . . 
untruthfulness.’”) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 608(b))).  
 147  See United States v. Ramirez-Rivera, 800 F.3d 1, 43 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding no abuse 
of discretion in prohibiting inquiry into specific details of murder as they do not tell anything 
of the witness’s tendency to be truthful); United States v. Barrett, 766 F.2d 609, 615 (1st Cir. 
1985) (finding no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow cross-examination of witness 
concerning pending murder charge under FRE 608(b)). 
 148  See United States v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 689 (2d Cir. 1957) (finding violation of 
the terms of the defendant-witness’s parole was not an offense relevant to his credibility). 
 149  See United States v. Pickard, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (D. Kan. 2002) (finding a 
charge of manslaughter and events surrounding it inadmissible under FRE 608(b) because 
they are not probative of the witness’s veracity). 
 150  See United States v. Lamb, 99 F. App’x 843, 847 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent more 
specific allegations, mere assault does not impugn a witness’s credibility . . . .”). 
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its face probative of veracity, courts will evaluate the evidence in light of the 
circumstances to determine whether the conduct, upon closer inspection, 
bears on the question of veracity.151 
C. Prohibition of Extrinsic Evidence 
Although FRE 608(b) permits inquiry on cross-examination about 
specific instances of conduct, the rule expressly prohibits the use of extrinsic 
evidence to prove such conduct occurred “in order to attack or support [a] 
witness’s character for truthfulness.”152  Extrinsic evidence is evidence 
“offered through documents or other witnesses,” rather than elicited from 
“cross-examination of the witness himself or herself.”153  For example, in 
United States v. Mangiameli, the court of appeals considered whether the 
trial court erred in excluding portions of a defense witness’s testimony that 
was offered to impeach the veracity of a prosecution witness.154  The defense 
witness would have testified about specific instances in which the 
prosecution witness lied under oath.155 
The court of appeals found that evidence of multiple instances of lying 
under oath was calculated to prove the prosecution witness’s general 
character for veracity, and thus, subject to the restrictions of FRE 608(b).156  
The court further noted that the provisions of FRE 608(b) provide that 
“specific instances of a witness[‘s] conduct, for the purpose of attacking” his 
character for truthfulness, “may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.”157  
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the defense could properly 
inquire into the specific instances of conduct on cross-examination of the 
prosecution witness to attack the witness’s character for truthfulness.158  But, 
by seeking to introduce the specific conduct evidence through the testimony 
of another witness, the defense attempted to attack the prosecution witness’s 
 
 151  See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“A ‘rule of thumb’ 
thus should be that convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility whereas 
those of violent or assaultive crimes generally do not . . . .”), superseded by rule, FED. R. EVID. 
609. 
 152  FED. R. EVID. 608(b); see United States v. Perez-Perez, 72 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 
1995) (“The notion underlying the rule is that while certain prior good or bad acts of a witness 
may constitute character evidence bearing on veracity, they are not evidence of enough force 
to justify the detour of extrinsic proof.”). 
 153  WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.20[1]; see also United States v. Boulerice, 
325 F.3d 75, 82 n.5 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining testimony elicited under cross-examination is 
not “extrinsic” and “[e]vidence is ‘extrinsic’ if offered through documents or other witnesses, 
rather than through cross-examination of the witness himself or herself”). 
 154  United States v. Mangiameli, 668 F.2d 1172, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 1982).   
 155  Id. at 1175. 
 156  Id. at 1175–76. 
 157  Id. at 1176.  
 158  Id. 
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character for truthfulness by extrinsic evidence of conduct, “which is 
forbidden by Rule 608(b).”159  Therefore, the court of appeals held that the 
evidence was properly excluded.160 
Moreover, the prohibition on extrinsic evidence means that once 
counsel asks the witness about the specific instance of conduct, counsel is 
“bound by the witness’s answer.”161  And if the witness denies the conduct, 
counsel may not introduce any further evidence by way of calling another 
witness or introducing physical evidence, to prove the witness committed the 
act.162  Thus, FRE 608(b) requires the cross-examiner to “take the answer of 
the witness.”163 
For example, in United States v. Goings, the court of appeals held that 
the trial court properly excluded written evidence that a government witness 
failed to repay the entire advance from her next paycheck.164  The court of 
appeals explained that FRE 608(b) allows cross-examination about specific 
instances of conduct that concern the witness’s character for truthfulness, 
“but forbids the introduction of extrinsic evidence to prove the specific bad 
act occurred.”165  Therefore, after the witness specifically denied that she had 
ever failed to fully repay a payroll advance from her next paycheck, “the 
defendants could not introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict her.”166 
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE MAJORITY APPROACH TO 
IMPEACHMENT OF A WITNESS’S CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS 
THROUGH SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT 
A. Dangers of Allowing Inquiry into Specific Instances of Conduct 
While specific-instance character evidence may be relevant to the 
question of whether a witness is testifying truthfully, the use of such 
evidence may cause problems with judicial administration and unfairness to 
 
 159  Id.   
 160  Mangiameli, 668 F.2d at 1176.   
 161  WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.22[1]; see also United States v. Martinez, 
76 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that if a witness denies making a particular 
statement on collateral matter, the examiner may not introduce extrinsic evidence to prove 
that witness did in fact make that statement); United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643, 654–55 
(11th Cir. 1984) (excluding evidence that government witness shot someone after he denied 
it on cross, because such evidence “falls squarely within Rule 608,” which limits inquiry to 
questions on cross). 
 162  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 104, § 6:36. 
 163  Id.; see also United States v. Matthews, 168 F.3d 1234, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(concluding if the witness denies conduct, it may not be proved by extrinsic evidence and the 
questioning party must take the witness’s answer). 
 164  United States v. Goings, 313 F.3d 423, 426–27 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 165  Id. at 427.  
 166  Id. 
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the parties.167  In fact, it has been argued that a complete bar on the use of 
specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness 
may be the preferable approach “given the dangers of prejudice (particularly 
if the witness is a party), of distraction and confusion, of abuse by asking 
unfounded questions, and the difficulties of determining whether particular 
acts relate to character for truthfulness.”168 
In his concurring opinion in State v. Scott, Justice Albin illustrated these 
problems and noted that this form of impeachment has been prohibited 
because “the probative value of such questioning is outweighed by the 
potential prejudice of diverting jurors from the central issues in a 
case . . . .”169  Moreover, Justice Albin explained that the threat of collateral 
attacks regarding specific instances that are “wholly unrelated to the 
litigation” could potentially discourage “crime victims from coming forward 
and injury victims from bringing their claims.”170  Such a threat might also 
deter defendants from taking the stand, and as a result, deprive the jury of 
their testimony.171  Finally, parties would be encouraged to “forage for 
impeachment evidence to launch wide-ranging attacks on a witness’s 
credibility.”172 
One of the general dangers presented by specific-instance character 
evidence is the potential to confuse or distract the jury from the substantive 
issues being tried.173  Evidence of specific acts is usually not relevant to the 
issues being tried, which can create a danger of confusion for the jury.174  In 
addition, it is doubtful that a jury would be able, even after instruction, to 
 
 167  See Victor Gold, Two Jurisdictions, Three Standards: The Admissibility of Misconduct 
Evidence to Impeach, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 769, 770–79 (2008) (discussing benefits and costs of 
misconduct impeachment, focusing on the adverse effect such evidence has on accurate fact 
finding, the tendency to encourage witness harassment, and the potential for undue delay); 2 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 979, at 1105 (1904) (“[E]ach additional witness introduces the entire group of questions as 
to his qualifications and his impeachment, and the amount of new evidence thus made possible 
may increase in far greater than geometrical proportion to the number of new witnesses, so 
that the trial may become in length extremely protracted, and with relatively little profit . . . 
[the] additional mass of testimony on minor points tends to overwhelm the material issues of 
the case and to confuse the tribunal . . . .”). 
 168  MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 91, § 41, at 92.  
 169  State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 340 (N.J. 2017) (Albin, J., concurring).  
 170  Id. 
 171  Id.  
 172  Id.  
 173  See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6112, at 35 (“Evidence of witness character also 
can undermine the integrity of jury decision-making by distracting the jury from the issues in 
the case and inducing a decision on an improper basis.”).  
 174  See id. (“[U]nlike evidence of bias or prior inconsistent statements, evidence 
concerning witness character bears no specific link to the facts or parties in a case.”); see also 
United States v. Perez-Perez, 72 F.3d 224, 227 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that evidence of police 
officer’s misconduct was not material to defendant’s guilt or innocence). 
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limit its consideration of specific instances of conduct solely to the 
evidence’s effect on the witness’s character for truthfulness.175  More 
concerning is when the witness is a party, which makes the ramifications of 
this prejudicial effect especially serious.  In a criminal case, this evidence 
exposes a testifying defendant to the danger that the jury may believe that 
the defendant is a bad person deserving of punishment, regardless of whether 
he or she committed the offense.176 
Misconduct evidence also raises questions concerning the appropriate 
treatment of witnesses. Such evidence creates potential for unfairness and 
embarrassment.177  Wigmore suggested that imposing limits on misconduct 
evidence was compelled by common decency: “[T]he ruthless flaying of 
personal character in the witness box is not only cowardly—because there is 
no escape for the victim—and brutal—because it inflicts the pain of public 
exposure of misdeeds to idle bystanders—but it has often not the slightest 
justification of necessity.”178  Witnesses face the potential for unfair surprise 
because opposing counsel can forage through a witness’s past and inquire 
into any conduct from his or her life that may bear on truthfulness.179  This 
presents an unfair challenge as witnesses cannot be expected to defend 
against every aspect of their lives, thus increasing the chances a witness “will 
be surprised by, and unprepared to respond to, totally unfounded charges of 
misconduct.”180  Misconduct evidence also may deter witnesses from coming 
forward for fear of being publicly humiliated since witnesses may be 
subjected to an unrestrained public dissection of their character, thus 
depriving “justice of the fullest opportunity to obtain useful testimony.”181 
 
 175  WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.02[2]; see also Krulewitch v. United 
States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be 
overcome by instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”) 
(citation omitted)). 
 176  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 104, § 6:34; see also WRIGHT & GOLD, supra 
note 3, § 6112 (“[W]hen the jury receives evidence that a witness is a bad man, it may be 
inclined to punish the party associated with that witness.”). 
 177  See Gold, supra note 167, at 778. 
 178  Id. (citing 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 979, at 826 (Chadbourn rev., 1970)).  
 179  See State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 342 (N.J. 2017) (Albin, J., concurring) (“Under our 
current rule, we have concluded that it would not be fair that a witness must answer for his 
whole life and respond to long ago instances of untruthful conduct.”). 
 180  WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6112, at 37; see also WIGMORE, supra note 167, § 
979, at 1105 (“This unfairness here lies in the fact that the opponent who desired by other 
witnesses to impeach by particular instances of misconduct might allege them as of any time 
and place that he pleased, and that, in spite of the utter falsity of the allegations, it would be 
practically impossible for the witness to have ready at the trial competent persons who would 
demonstrate the falsity of allegations that might range over the whole scope of his life.”). 
 181  WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.02[2] (citing 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, 
§ 921, at 724 (Chadbourn rev., 1970)); Gold, supra note 167, at 778 (“This ‘ruthless flaying’ 
can even undermine accurate fact-finding.  Witnesses may be reluctant to come forward, and 
important evidence may be lost, when witnesses are to be subjected to in-court dissection of 
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Finally, each of these dangers present the underlying possibility of 
causing undue delay.182  The potential for “mini-trials” and side-excursions 
into each witness’s past, which as noted above is usually not relevant to the 
substantive issues of the case, create a real danger of not only confusing the 
issues but prolonging the trial.183  There is also the possibility that a witness 
may not dispute the alleged misconduct but “may want to provide an 
explanation that diminishes its import or testify to other conduct that reveals 
the misconduct to be unrepresentative of her character,”184 thus further 
detracting from the main issues and wasting time on collateral matters 
wholly unrelated to the case. 
B. Arguments for Using the Majority Approach to Impeachment of a 
Witness’s Character for Truthfulness Through Specific Instances 
of Conduct 
While the use of specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s 
character for truthfulness presents various dangers, conscious awareness of 
these concerns provided the basis for crafting FRE 608.185 Specific conduct 
evidence is not permitted wholesale and is subject to various limitations.  In 
his concurring opinion in State v. Scott, Chief Justice Rabner illustrated the 
benefits of the majority approach, noting that there are safeguards put in 
place that protect against the acknowledged dangers.186  In addition, Chief 
Justice Rabner emphasized that New Jersey’s current formulation shields 
witnesses from being questioned about specific-conduct character evidence 
that bears directly on credibility and thus has the effect of presenting 
witnesses to the jury “under an artificial light.”187  Therefore, the majority 
approach as represented by FRE 608 is crafted in a way to alleviate the 
dangers outlined in the previous section and gives equal weight to the 
competing concern of fostering the search for the truth.188 
 
 
their character and past conduct.”).  
 182  WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.02[2]; Gold, supra note 167, at 778 
(explaining that limits on the admissibility of misconduct evidence can be justified on the 
ground that such evidence has the potential to “burden a trial with distracting and time-
consuming detours from the central issues”).  
 183  WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6112, at 39 (“[W]ithout limits on admissibility, a 
case can dissolve into a series of mini-trials examining the life history of each witness.  Such 
a process would distract and confuse the jury, thus undermining the fundamental goal of 
accurate fact-finding.”). 
 184  Gold, supra note 167, at 779 (quoting 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 983, at 
841(Chadbourn rev., 1970)). 
 185  FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes.  
 186  State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 339–40 (N.J. 2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring).  
 187  Id. at 336, 339.  
 188  See id.  
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First, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence 
recognized the potential for abuse and dangers, thus the federal rule was 
crafted to address the dangers of permitting specific conduct evidence.189  
The Advisory Committee Notes to subdivision (b) provide, “[e]ffective 
cross-examination demands that some allowance be made for going into 
matters of this kind, but the possibilities of abuse are substantial.  
Consequently[,] safeguards are erected in the form of specific 
requirements . . . .”190  Those requirements include that the conduct be 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.191  Moreover, the overriding 
protection of FRE 403 requires that probative value not be substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or 
misleading the jury.192  FRE 611 further bars harassment and undue 
embarrassment of witnesses.193 
One of the major limitations contained in FRE 608(b) is the prohibition 
on the use of extrinsic evidence.194  This limitation is designed to protect 
against undue delay as well as confusion of the issues.195  As explained 
above, when a witness is questioned about prior misconduct, counsel is 
“bound” by the witness’s answer and may not introduce extrinsic evidence 
to prove the misconduct.196  Thus, counsel may not call another witness or 
bring in other evidence to disprove a denial and show that the conduct 
occurred.197  Absent this limitation, impeachment of the witness could trigger 
time consuming mini-trials on collateral issues.198  This concern illustrates 
the principal purpose of this safeguard—to limit the time spent on issues that 
are not central to the case and to maintain the focus of the trial on substantive 
issues and matters bearing directly on credibility.199  In addition, the 
limitation helps to reduce the extent of unfair prejudice that accompanies any 
 
 189  FED. R. EVID. 608 advisory committee’s notes. 
 190  Id.  
 191  Id. 
 192  Id. 
 193  Id. 
 194  FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific 
instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for 
truthfulness.”).  
 195  See State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 336 (N.J. 2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring); see also 
United States v. Simmons, 444 F. Supp. 500, 507 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (finding FRE 608(b) 
excludes extrinsic evidence “to avoid minitrials on wholly collateral matters which tend to 
distract and confuse the jury”). 
 196  See supra Part III.C. 
 197  WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.22[1]; see also United States v. Martinez, 
76 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding if a witness denies making a particular statement 
on a collateral matter, the examiner may not introduce extrinsic evidence to prove that the 
witness did in fact make that statement). 
 198  See MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 91, § 49, at 200-01. 
 199  MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 104, § 6:36.  
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opening into behavior bearing on untruthfulness, since such behavior is 
likely to pertain to negative conduct and juries are likely to misuse the 
evidence.200 
In sum, as explained by Chief Justice Rabner, the bar against extrinsic 
evidence alleviates the possible dangers from inquiry into specific instances 
of conduct for two reasons.  First, “[t]here is no danger of confusion of 
issues, because the matter stops with question and answer.”201  Second, 
“[t]here is no danger of unfair surprise, because the impeached witness is not 
obliged to be ready with other witnesses to answer the extrinsic testimony of 
the opponent, for there is none to be answered . . . .”202  Thus, many of the 
major concerns that come with permitting inquiry into specific instances of 
conduct are addressed and properly limited by the prohibition against 
extrinsic evidence. 
In addition, FRE 608(b) is also subject to FRE 403 and FRE 611 as 
further safeguards to bar testimony that would confuse the issues, distract the 
jury, or cause undue prejudice or harassment.203  As explained above, the text 
of the rule leaves to the trial court’s discretion the determination of whether 
or not to allow inquiry into specific instances of conduct.204  The court must 
consider whether the conduct is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.  
Moreover, the overriding requirements of FRE 403 require the court to 
balance the issues and ensure that the determination is guided by the 
understanding that such evidence can have a detrimental effect on the parties, 
and the policies and goals of the justice system. 
United States v. Shinderman provides an illustration of the careful 
balancing process that courts employ.205  In this case, the court of appeals 
had to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting 
the government, on cross-examination, to question the defendant about his 
responses to questions when applying for a medical license.206  The 
defendant applied for a medical license in 2001 and 2002.207  On each 
application, he answered “no” to a question asking whether he had ever 
“been charged, summonsed, indicted, arrested or convicted of any criminal 
 
 200  Id. 
 201  State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 336 (N.J. 2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring) (quoting 3A 
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 981, at 838 (Chadbourn rev., 1970)). 
 202  Id. 
 203  FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules (“[T]he 
overriding protection of Rule 403 requires that probative value not be outweighed by danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, and that of Rule 611 bars 
harassment and undue embarrassment.”).  
 204  See supra Part III.A. 
 205  United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 206  Id. at 19. 
 207  Id. at 16. 
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offense.”208  The government had evidence that defendant had been arrested 
twice for drug-related offenses, although neither arrest resulted in a 
conviction.209 
The government wanted to cross-examine the defendant regarding the 
applications, in order to cast doubt upon his truthfulness.210  The defendant 
objected and moved to exclude such an inquiry.211  He admitted that he had 
been arrested, but asserted that the arrests had been expunged thus, he had 
answered the questions truthfully and on the advice of counsel.212  Defendant 
offered an affidavit from his counsel to support this contention.213  The trial 
court concluded that the affidavit “provided ‘no convincing ground’ to 
support the defendant’s belief that the arrests had vanished” and did not have 
to be disclosed on the applications.214  The trial court ruled that the 
government could cross-examine defendant about his arrest-related answers, 
but precluded the introduction of the arrest records themselves into 
evidence.215 
In assessing this ruling, the court of appeals noted that a trial judge’s 
discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination is “subject to the 
overarching need to balance probative worth against prejudicial impact.”216  
The court of appeals found no abuse of discretion and emphasized that a 
“witness’s willingness to lie to the government in an application for a license 
is highly probative of his character for truthfulness.”217  Moreover, the court 
found that “temporal considerations” weighed in favor of permitting the 
evidence since defendant’s answers were “not remote in time but, rather, 
were roughly contemporaneous” with the criminal conduct charged.218  
Finally, the central factual issue at trial pertained to the defendant’s intent, 
making his credibility “highly relevant to the outcome of the case.”219 
After determining that the misconduct evidence could be a matter for 
cross-examination under the requirements of FRE 608(b), the court then 
addressed the question of prejudice.220  The court noted that evidence of prior 
 
 208  Id.   
 209  Id.  
 210  Id. 
 211  Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 16. 
 212  Id. 
 213  Id.  
 214  Id. 
 215  Id.  
 216  Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules) 
(noting that the balancing function is spelled out in FRE 403).  
 217  Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 17. 
 218  Id. 
 219  Id. 
 220  Id.  
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arrests carried some potential for adverse effect, however, it ultimately 
concluded that the effect was not particularly inflammatory or of such 
detriment to compel exclusion of the evidence.221  Also relevant to this 
determination, the court explained, were the affirmative steps the trial court 
took to minimize the risk of unfair prejudice.222  The trial court did not permit 
the government to elicit any unnecessary or “tawdry details” regarding the 
arrests.223 The trial court “allowed the defendant to tell the jury about the 
ultimate disposition of the arrests and about his belief that they had been 
expunged,” and additionally, “offered to give a limiting instruction.”224 
This case highlights the arguments in favor of the majority approach 
and illustrates all of the factors properly taken into account by trial judges 
when determining whether cross-examination into specific instances of 
conduct is appropriate.  Further, the case demonstrates that this role given to 
judges is not taken lightly and the rule requires in-depth balancing which 
serves to alleviate and account for the possible dangers from the use of 
specific instances of conduct. 
C. Counterarguments to the Use of the Majority Approach to 
Impeachment of a Witness’s Character for Truthfulness Through 
Specific Instances of Conduct 
While the federal rule was crafted with these dangers in mind, it is 
argued that the limitations in FRE 608(b) and the other rules of evidence do 
not provide adequate safeguards to prevent these dangers, and in some cases 
actually serve to create additional concerns. As explained by Justice Albin 
in his concurring opinion in State v. Scott, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
has “determined that ‘wide-ranging collateral attacks on the general 
credibility of a witness’ may lead to jury confusion and distract the jury from 
‘the true issues in the case.’”225  Justice Albin argued that these concerns are 
not diminished merely because extrinsic evidence cannot be introduced.226 
 
 221  Id. (“We long have recognized that ‘all evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is 
only unfair prejudice which must be avoided.’”) (quoting United States v. Rodríguez-
Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir.1989))).  
 222  Id.  
 223  Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 17. 
 224  Id. 
 225  State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 342 (N.J. 2017) (Albin, J., concurring) (quoting State v. 
Guenther, 854 A.2d 308, 315 (N.J. 2004)). 
 226  Id. at 342–43 (“Allowing expansive collateral attacks on a witness’s credibility 
through prior specific conduct would likely have the unintended consequence of prompting 
attorneys to forage through a witness’s past . . . .  Such prior acts of dishonesty would bear 
little relevance to the [witness’s] credibility in court but likely would have an outsized effect 
on the jury’s evaluation of that witness.  The admission of the singular incident, or incidents, 
of untruthfulness would allow the jury to engage in the most simplistic and dangerous 
assumption—once a liar, always a liar.”).  
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Justice Albin also cautioned that the only limitation guarding the expansive 
use of specific instances of conduct is Rule 403, which leaves all of the 
concerns and potential for danger within the discretion of trial judges.227 
First, regarding the limitation on the use of extrinsic evidence, it is 
recognized that the exclusion of extrinsic evidence of specific conduct to 
impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness does not completely eliminate 
the danger of confusion and prejudice from inquiry into collateral matters 
“because the very question itself can convey the theoretically barred 
information to the jury.”228  Merely asking a question about a specific 
instance of misconduct and leaving with the jury only a bare denial from the 
witness can have prejudicial effects on the witness as well as allow the jury 
to engage in speculation on an issue that is collateral to the merits of the 
case.229 
Moreover, the phrase that the cross-examiner must “take the answer of 
the witness” does not mean that the cross-examiner cannot continue pressing 
for an admission that the past conduct did occur.230  FRE 608(b) authorizes 
this procedure.231  Thus, while counsel is “bound by the witness’s answer,” 
this merely means extrinsic evidence may not be introduced.232  Counsel may 
proceed, however, with questioning and continue pressing for admission, for 
instance, “by reminding the witness of the penalties for perjury.”233  This 
 
 227  Id. at 341–42. 
 228  WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.22[2][c][ii]; see also MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 104, § 6:34 (“Simply asking can impeach.  Few opportunities for 
lawyers provide better opportunity to inject prejudice and collateral issues into a case than 
cross-examination of witnesses on prior acts for purposes of suggesting untruthfulness.  In 
some respects, this mechanism of impeachment invites abuse because the examining lawyer 
almost cannot lose.”).   
 229  Scott, 163 A.3d at 342 (Albin, J., concurring); see also United States v. Davenport, 
753 F.2d 1460, 1463 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The prejudice to the defendant was, thus, created by 
the question itself rather than by the testimony given in response.  The danger in such a 
situation is that the prosecution will use the question to waft an unwarranted innuendo into 
the jury box, knowing that the witness’[s] denial will only serve to defend her credibility, 
while leaving uncontradicted the reference to the defendant’s prior bad conduct.”); Gold, 
supra note 167, at 775 n.25 (citing 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 988, at 921 (Chadbourn 
rev., 1970)) (“This method of inquiry or cross-examination is frequently resorted to by 
counsel for the very purpose of injuring by indirection a character which they are forbidden 
directly to attack in that way; they rely upon the mere putting of the question (not caring that 
it is answered negatively) to convey their convert insinuation.”).   
 230  WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.22[1].  
 231  See id.  
 232  MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 91, § 41, at 94; see also United States v. Ling, 581 
F.2d 1118, 1121 (4th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he examiner must be content with the witness’[s] 
answer . . . .  Although the cross-examiner may continue to press the defendant for an 
admission, he cannot call other witnesses to prove the misconduct after defendant’s denial.”). 
 233  MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 91, § 41, at 94; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, 
supra note 104, § 6:36 (“[T]he cross-examiner need not take the first answer given.  The very 
idea of cross implies testing and probing, which necessarily means that the lawyer conducting 
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creates concern for undue harassment and still leaves open the threat of jury 
distraction and confusion pertaining to issues collateral to the merits of the 
case.234 
Second, apart from the limitation on extrinsic evidence, the only 
safeguard on the use of specific-instance character evidence is Rule 403.235  
The concern with Rule 403 is that while it does take into account the dangers 
that are associated with cross-examination on specific instances of conduct, 
trial courts are given broad discretion to make this determination.236  Thus, 
all of these concerns are left in the hands of one judge and the determination 
cannot be overturned unless the reviewing court finds an abuse of 
discretion.237  It has been argued that the task of regulating prejudice 
delegated by Rule 403 allocates broad power to trial judges to make 
individualized decisions about the relative importance of competing 
principles, and as such is “inconsistent with the general hierarchical structure 
of our legal system.  Trial judges customarily exercise more limited, 
reviewable discretion within a framework of standards set by higher 
authority.”238 
Moreover, as Justice Albin noted, even in cases involving similar 
conduct, different judges may come to different conclusions when weighing 
the Rule 403 factors or when determining whether conduct is probative of 
truthfulness.239  Thus, it is argued, the admissibility of potentially damaging 
evidence is improperly left to a case-by-case determination that may not be 
uniformly or consistently applied. 
 
 
the cross-examination must have a chance to press and even to push the witness.”).  
 234  MCCORMICK ET AL., supra note 91, § 41, at 94; Scott, 163 A.3d at 342 (Albin, J., 
concurring) (“Concerns about witness fairness and jury confusion are not diminished merely 
because extrinsic evidence cannot be introduced to impeach the witness.”).  
 235  Scott, 163 A.3d at 341–42 (Albin, J., concurring).  
 236  See supra note 92 and accompanying text.   
 237  See United States v. Brown, 500 F.3d 48, 58 (1st Cir. 2007) (“We typically review 
Rule 403 determinations for abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5, 
17 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Rule 403 judgments are typically battlefield determinations, and great 
deference is owed to the trial court’s superior coign of vantage.  ‘Only rarely—and in 
extraordinarily compelling circumstances—will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, 
reverse a district court’s on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative 
value and unfair effect.’”) (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st 
Cir. 1988))).  
 238  J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-choice Approach to Limiting Prejudicial Evidence, 
64 IND. L.J. 831, 832 (1989).  
 239  Scott, 163 A.3d at 342 (Albin, J., concurring).  Compare Gustafson v. State, 590 
S.W.2d 853, 859 (Ark. 1979) (finding inquiry about theft under Rule 608(b) proper), with 
Rhodes v. State, 634 S.W.2d 107, 110–11 (Ark. 1982) (modifying Gustafson finding 
interpretation of Rule 608(b) too broad and holding inquiry about theft improper).   
MONTAN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/21/2018  2:46 PM 
2019] COMMENT 469 
V. NEW JERSEY’S OPTIONS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE AND MAKE CHANGES 
TO THE CURRENT RULE 
While Justice Albin expressed valid concerns regarding the use of 
specific instances of conduct to impeach a witness’s character for 
truthfulness, a complete ban on any use of such evidence presents equally 
troubling concerns.  There are options to address the issues on both sides.  
Allowing inquiry into past misconduct does have benefits.  While it is 
recognized that it can be difficult to point to past conduct and determine with 
any degree of certainty whether the witness is telling the truth or lying, 
credibility is a critical issue in almost every case.240  “Character evidence, 
despite its flaws, may still serve a purpose in calling to the jury’s attention 
to what might be an otherwise unknown deficiency of the witness and thus 
give the jury a more adequate basis for judging his testimony.”241 
“Witnesses are often carefully groomed and coached by counsel to 
project an in-court character which suggests a high level of credibility.”242  
“Evidence [that reveals] the true character of a witness can be used to poke 
holes in this facade.”243  Further, character evidence can act as a check on an 
attorney to discourage the offering of an unreliable witness because that 
witness’s lack of credibility could be revealed by opposing counsel on cross-
examination.244  Finally, admitting evidence regarding a witness’s character 
for truthfulness can advance accurate fact-finding (a basic policy goal of the 
evidence rules), because “just as a jury can be prejudiced against the plaintiff 
by the inclusion of some evidence, it can be misled by the exclusion of other 
evidence.”245 
In light of the costs and benefits of allowing specific instances of 
conduct to impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness and taking into 
account the arguments posed by both sides, it seems that New Jersey’s 
current formulation does not do enough to address all of the concerns.  The 
case that ignited this debate between the justices highlights the problems 
with New Jersey’s current formulation.  Where the prosecutor had a good-
 
 240  WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 608.02[1]. 
 241  Id. (quoting Mason Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony, 24 IOWA 
L. REV. 498, 534 (1939)). 
 242  WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6112, at 32; see also Victor Gold, Covert Advocacy: 
Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C. L. 
REV. 481, 484–86 (1987) (discussing “courtroom style” psychological techniques lawyers use 
that are aimed at inducing juries to employ an extralegal basis for its decisions). 
 243  WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 3, § 6112, at 32.  
 244  Id. 
 245  Vichare v. AMBAC Inc., 106 F.3d 457, 468 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that “there are 
two sides to the 608(b) coin,” prejudice and probative value, and exclusion of evidence solely 
because it may be prejudicial cuts against the primary policy implicated by FRE 608, 
accuracy, by depriving the jury of information that bears directly on a witness’s credibility 
leading to inaccurate results).   
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faith basis to ask the question, why should it be improper to ask a witness 
whether she had lied before to protect her son about a serious matter?  Such 
an inquiry bears directly on the witness’s character for truthfulness.  As 
expressed by Chief Justice Rabner, however, New Jersey’s approach shields 
witnesses from this type of inquiry and as a result impedes the search for 
truth and presents witnesses to the jury in an artificial light.246 
Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile why N.J.R.E. 608(b) allows 
evidence of a witness’s prior false criminal accusations but inquiry into a 
witness’s statements made to exonerate a person is prohibited.247  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court made clear in Guenther that its decision was not made 
“on constitutional grounds, but rather by making a narrow exception to 
N.J.R.E. 608 consistent with the rationale of that rule.”248  Thus, the question 
remains as to what the logical difference is between a prior false statement 
of accusation and a prior false statement of exoneration that justifies the 
disparate treatment under N.J.R.E. 608.  In addition, the exception to 
N.J.R.E. 608 that resulted from Guenther, now 608(b), allows “[t]he 
credibility of a witness in a criminal case [to] be attacked by evidence that 
the witness made a prior false accusation . . . .”249  This exception not only 
allows inquiry into specific instances of conduct but goes beyond the federal 
rule and does not prohibit the use of extrinsic evidence; rather it is left within 
the discretion of trial judge as to whether such evidence should be 
admitted.250  Thus, it is difficult to understand why FRE 608(b) is disfavored 
when it provides a rule of limited admissibility, protects against the dangers 
presented by specific instances of conduct, and does not go as far as N.J.R.E. 
608(b) by prohibiting extrinsic evidence. 
The facts of State v. Scott provide a good example of how FRE 608(b) 
could be applied to avoid any of the concerns regarding the use of specific 
instances of conduct.251  The State sought to introduce evidence of two prior 
occasions on which the witness, Barbella, allegedly lied to police to 
exonerate her son, the defendant.252  Applying FRE 608(b), the trial judge 
 
 246  State v. Scott, 163 A.3d 325, 335, 339 (N.J. 2017) (Rabner, C.J., concurring). 
 247  Id. at 339–40 (“False testimony to exonerate is just as troublesome as a false criminal 
accusation.  Both impede the search for the truth.  Indeed, it is hard to explain to the public 
why one area can be probed and not the other.”). 
 248  State v. Guenther, 854 A.2d 308, 322 (N.J. 2004). 
 249  N.J. R. EVID. 608(b) (emphasis added).  
 250  Id.; see also Guenther, 854 A.2d at 324 (“Among the factors to be considered in 
deciding the issue of admissibility are . . . the number of witnesses, the items of extrinsic 
evidence, and the amount of time required for presentation of the issue at trial . . . .  If the 
court, pursuant to its gate-keeping role, determines that evidence of the prior false accusation 
is admissible, the court has the discretion to limit the number of witnesses who will testify 
concerning the matter at trial.”). 
 251  See supra Part I. 
 252  Scott, 163 A.3d at 328.  
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would have the discretion to admit the evidence.  Whether such evidence 
could be permitted would be subject to Rule 403 and any testimony that 
would confuse the issues, distract the jury, or cause undue prejudice would 
not be permitted.  The majority in Scott, and Chief Justice Rabner in his 
concurring opinion, noted that there was a question concerning the 
prejudicial effect that could result from asking about this prior conduct 
because it reveals that the defendant had previously been in trouble with the 
police.253  The trial judge, however, could sanitize the evidence and only 
allow the State to ask whether Barbella lied to the police to exonerate others 
in the past.  Thus, by removing the fact that she had lied to exonerate her son, 
the prejudice that could result against the defendant is eliminated but the jury 
would still receive the information that relates to the witness’s character for 
untruthfulness.  In addition, if Barbella chose to deny that she had made those 
statements, the prosecutor, under FRE 608(b), would have to take the 
witness’s answer and no extrinsic evidence could come in to prove that 
Barbella engaged in the alleged conduct. 
Given this illustration and the competing concerns regarding specific 
instances of conduct, it would be beneficial for New Jersey to change 
N.J.R.E. 608(a) to align with the majority approach.  While the 
disadvantages outlined above do present valid concerns, New Jersey could 
use the federal rule as a starting point and craft a rule that will take into 
account the arguments and concerns expressed on both sides.  The states 
have created different ways to handle the use of specific instances of conduct 
with many taking a more restrictive approach.  For example, Tennessee’s 
rule, which follows a more restrictive approach, could be a framework for 
New Jersey to follow. 
A. Tennessee Approach 
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides: 
Specific instances of conduct of a witness for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting the witness’s character for truthfulness, 
other than convictions of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not 
be proved by extrinsic evidence.  They may, however, if probative 
of truthfulness or untruthfulness and under the following 
conditions, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness 
concerning the witness’s character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness or concerning the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which the character witness 
being cross-examined has testified.254 
Both FRE 608(b) and Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) allow for the 
 
 253  Id. at 333; id. at 339 (Rabner, C.J., concurring).  
 254  TENN. R. EVID. 608(b).  
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impeachment of a witness by inquiring on cross-examination into specific 
instances of conduct that are probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.255  
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) also does not permit the introduction of 
extrinsic evidence to prove the specific instance of conduct had occurred.256 
Tennessee, however, has a number of added procedural safeguards that 
are designed to prevent common types of abuse on cross-examination.257  
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) has three specific provisions that must 
be satisfied in order to use specific conduct evidence to attack a witness’s 
character for truthfulness: 
(1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the jury’s 
presence and must determine that the alleged conduct has 
probative value and that a reasonable factual basis exists for the 
inquiry; (2) The conduct must have occurred no more than ten 
years before commencement of the action or prosecution, but 
evidence of a specific instance of conduct not qualifying under 
this paragraph (2) is admissible if the proponent gives to the 
adverse party sufficient advance notice of intent to use such 
evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to 
contest the use of such evidence and the court determines in the 
interests of justice that the probative value of that evidence, 
supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially 
outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (3) If the witness to be 
impeached is the accused in a criminal prosecution, the State must 
give the accused reasonable written notice of the impeaching 
conduct before trial, and the court upon request must determine 
that the conduct’s probative value on credibility outweighs its 
unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues.  The court may 
rule on the admissibility of such proof prior to the trial but in any 
event shall rule prior to the testimony of the accused.  If the court 
makes a final determination that such proof is admissible for 
impeachment purposes, the accused need not actually testify at the 
trial to later challenge the propriety of the determination.258 
Tennessee also added a further restriction concerning juvenile conduct which 
has no comparable federal provision for such evidence.259  Tennessee Rule 
of Evidence 608(c) provides:   
Evidence of specific instances of conduct of a witness committed 
while the witness was a juvenile is generally not admissible under 
this rule.  The court may, however, allow evidence of such 
 
 255  FED. R. EVID. 608(b); TENN. R. EVID. 608(b). 
 256  TENN. R. EVID. 608(b). 
 257  Robert Banks, Jr., Some Comparisons Between the New Tennessee Rules of Evidence 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence Part II, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 499, 531–36 (1990).  
 258  TENN. R. EVID. 608(b). 
 259  Banks, Jr., supra note 257, at 536. 
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conduct of a witness other than the accused in a criminal case if 
the conduct would be admissible to attack the credibility of an 
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is 
necessary for a fair determination in a civil action or criminal 
proceeding.260 
B. How New Jersey Can Incorporate Tennessee’s Rule to Address 
Justice Albin’s Concerns 
New Jersey has the capability of drafting a restrictive rule similar to 
Tennessee in order to fully address the concerns expressed by Justice Albin.  
Similar to Tennessee, New Jersey can require a hearing to determine that a 
reasonable factual basis exists for cross-examining a witness about specific 
instances of conduct and whether the alleged conduct has probative value in 
assessing the credibility of the witness.  In addition, in criminal cases, the 
rule could require counsel to give pretrial notice of intent to question a 
witness about misconduct, provide an evidentiary basis, and show that the 
probative worth outweighs unfair prejudice.261  This would expressly 
incorporate the requirements of Rule 403 into the language of the rule, make 
notice of the intent to use specific conduct evidence a requirement, and place 
a burden on the party seeking to admit such evidence to present specific facts 
and circumstances. 
Moreover, if still not satisfied by Rule 403, New Jersey could adopt an 
altered balancing test for courts to employ in making the determination 
regarding prejudice.  Minnesota, for example, in criminal cases, requires the 
court to employ a balancing test that “is not the Rule 403 test favoring 
admissibility unless probative value is ‘substantially outweighed’ by unfair 
prejudice.”262  Rather, the rule incorporated the balancing test used by the 
court in State v. Fallin,263 and under this test, “the court should not allow the 
cross-examination if probative value and unfair prejudice are closely 
balanced.”264  The evidence should not be allowed unless the prosecutor 
establishes that the probative value on the issue of credibility outweighs the 
potential for unfair prejudice.265  Thus, this rule would err on the side of 
exclusion if the prejudicial effect of the evidence is a closer call. 
 
 
 260  TENN. R. EVID. 608(c). 
 261  Minnesota also has a similar restriction.  See MINN. R. EVID. 608(c) (prosecutor must 
give pretrial notice of intent to question defendant or defense witnesses about misconduct, 
providing evidentiary basis, and showing that probative worth outweighs unfair prejudice). 
 262  MINN. R. EVID. 608(c) advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment.  
 263  540 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. 1995). 
 264  MINN. R. EVID. 608(c) advisory committee’s comment to 2006 amendment (citing 
State v. Fallin, 540 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 1995)).  
 265  Id.  
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New Jersey can adopt a time limit that declares certain actions after a 
specified number of years presumptively barred.  New Jersey could take this 
a step further and set a shorter time limit than the ten-year limit in 
Tennessee’s rule and add any further burdens on the party seeking to present 
such evidence.  New Jersey could also add further restrictions as deemed 
necessary like Tennessee did by adding subsection (c) to its rule to address 
specific concerns in particular contexts.  Further, New Jersey could adopt 
restrictions and standards to help guide judges when making the 
determination to allow cross-examination into specific instances of conduct.  
With regard to conduct that is probative of truthfulness, New Jersey can elect 
to take the narrow view which provides that conduct is admissible only if it 
directly involves falsehood or deception. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Guenther explained that 
New Jersey bars “the use of prior instances of conduct to attack the 
credibility of a witness for two essential reasons: to prevent unfairness to the 
witness and to avoid confusion of the issues before the jury.”266  These goals, 
however, can be met by carefully crafting a rule that would address such 
concerns and at the same time provide for the use of specific instances of 
conduct in cases, like the case at issue here, where such instances bear 
directly on a witness’s veracity.  As Justice Albin explained when writing 
for the court in State v. Guenther, when “the ‘auxiliary policies’ underlying 
the rule do not apply, the rationale for the exclusion of such evidence no 
longer exists.”267  As shown by FRE 608(b) and the majority of states that 
have adopted similar rules, it is possible to adopt a rule that will address the 
auxiliary polices and under such a rule, the rationale for total exclusion of 
specific instances of conduct would no longer exist. 
 
 
 266  State v. Guenther, 854 A.2d 308, 314 (N.J. 2004). 
 267  Id. at 315.  
